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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit, at the European University 
Institute, was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as a 
forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
analyses in their own right, these projects should prove valuable 
to Community policy-making.
Further information about the work of the European Policy 
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Although industrial restructuring has always existed in 
some form or another, only in recent years has it received 
attention as an economic problem, or more specifically as a 
problem of economic policy. The main reason for this attention is 
the alarming increase in unemployment in the last years. The 
growth optimism has gone; at the same time, discussions on how to 
adjust to the challenging circumstances appeared. These often 
merely centered around the private-state, deregulation-regulation, 
market-planning opposition. This is exactly the first point I 
want to make in this paper: all too often, academic as well as 
practical dealing with problems of industrial restructuring has 
been done in a highly normative, polemical and also simplistic 
way.
The general way of thinking in market-vs-state terms is 
not only unsatisfactory when it comes studying the economy, but it 
also does not ease policy-making. To anticipate the conclusion of 
the case studied, we can say that the ambiguous situation arose, 
of politicians thinking in terms of and adapting their behaviour 
to ideological perceptions, while on the other hand the
1 I am grateful to B. Marin, J. Pariioleau and W. Streeck for 




























































































industry itself seemed to take a very pragmatic stance in 
designing its policies. Industry often rejects the "market 
mechanism" as an organising force whenever this can lead to 
temporary advantages, without finding itself in trouble 
ideologically. As far as the politicians are concerned, they are 
aware of those "temporary practices" by the industry, but 
interpret them in terms of marginal deviations from the ideal 
type, i.e the free market. As will be made clear in the paper, 
other organizational forms with problem' solving capacity may 
exist. The one found here, i.e. industry self-governance was by 
the politicians not perceived as such. A specific characteristic 
of this self-governance meant here is that it always needs some 
support (organizational, legitimizing, etc.) by the state (in 
contrats to cartels for example). This support was indeed provided 
by the EC, but in a rather incremental way and was not put in a 
broader context. This situation had two main effects: first, the 
EC working out its own solutions, quite independently from the 
actions taken by the industry itself but at the same time giving 
this industry backing for its self-governance plans. Secondly, 
and following from this first point, the industry solved its 
problems with tiie help of the Community without however being 
asked to take "public" factors into consideration in their 





























































































This rather surprising conclusion will now be given 
support by looking at the restructuring-process of the chemical
*
textile fibre industry (1) and the reactions towards it by the 
industry and the political scenario on an European level.
The case studied will not be submitted to theories on 
structural adjustment in open-market economies, since no such 
theories exist - nor will I as yet try to formulate one. The 
impossibility of relying on established theories for this study 
will not necessarily make it a narrative one. My intention will 
go more towards applying sociological concepts, i.e. using more 
general methods of sociological science in trying to grasp or 
"verstehen" (M. Weber) the complexity of social phenomena such as, 
precisely, the restructuring of an industrial branch. All this is 
not done in order to push the studied problématique to a more 
abstract level but rather the other way around, to bring in 
possibilities or tools for enabling one to see what really happens 
without interpreting it in the all too reductionist terms of 
market and state (2).
Therefore I will start by drawing the distinction 
between two alternative modes of social coordination of individual




























































































activities, market coorciinat ion on the one hand and 
organisational coordination on the other as one of the most 
important distinctions made in social science in the analysis for 
social phenomena.
MARKET COORDINATION represents a mechanism of social coordination 
that rests on a network of actual and potential exchange relations 
between mutually adjusting but individually deciding actors, a 
mechanism whose total social results are brought about 
unintendedly, or, to use A.SMITH'S famous phrase, by the 
"invisible hand". The economic market in the usual sense is the 
typical field of activities coordinated by such a mechanism. Yet, 
beyond the "economic field", this type of coordination can be 
found everywhere in social life.
ORGANISATIONAL ACTION is the term for a situation where the 
activities of a set of actors are coordinated (by a "visible 
hand") in order to bring about an intended total result.
The restructuring-processes can now be studied according 
to these two categories. Industrial restructuring can 
subsequently be described as a process with an internal logic of 
its own and/or a policy construction, directed to the attainment 
of goals. These insight drawn from general sociological theory 
lead us to distinguish between three categories of restructuring: 




























































































secondly, what I will mark privat e and thirdly, public 
restructuring.
Autonomous restructuring corresponds to the
aforeruentioned "market coordination" logic , being an application 
of it in a more concrete, research-specific form:
The autonomous-restructuring 
structural process of change 
the aggregate result of a 
decisions by firms.
category is defined by the 
in the industry which appears as 
large number of uncoordinated
This model thus holds that restructuring also takes place without 
any kind of restructuring-policy.
The second mode of social coordination, "organized action", will 
for my purposes be divided in two different categories: one which 
is organised privately and one which is organised publicly.
- private restructuring would then be the process of change which 
is- the resuit of planned, coordinated action of some sector- 
dominating firms (e.g. cartel) or other industry-specific 
organisat ions .
- public restructuring, then, contains the processes of change 
which are the consequence of policy and planning by the state 
("sectoral policy", "Branchenausschuesse", etc.).
The advantage of this methodological starting-point does 
not lie in the three different categories as such, since they are 
studied separately (especially autonomous restructuring by 




























































































by students of public policy) but in the fact that they are used 
in combination for one single case. The separate categories can 
only be set to full advantage when something about the others is 
known as well.' In addition, very interesting insights in the 
dynamic of an industrial sector can be gained by studying the how 
and why of a transit from one restructuring process to another at 



























































































01. The Crisis in the European Chemical Fibre Industry and the 
Situation Before.
After a first period of rapid growth, a crisis occurred 
in the West-European chemical fibre industry from 1973 on. The 
crisis seemed to be a worldwide one but the producers in Western 
' Europe were even worse off than their American or Japanese 
counterparts. Whereas the decrease in Western-European production 
was already 19 per cent in 1975, it was "only" 11 per cent in the 
USA and Japan, and the production in other countries still 
increased with 6 per cent. A crisis which, for many producers, 
seemed rather local at the start, but very quickly turned out be 
threateningly general. The situation led to major losses for all 
producers concerned. The losses have subsisted until 1983 (Table 
1 ) .
Table 1 : Losses of W. European man-made fibre producers (in 
millions of DM)
Man-made fibre Industry - losses of W. European producers 















































































































Every fibre-making and selling company in Europe has been
yoperating at a loss from early in 1973/74 on.
The period preceding this crisis was one of what I would 
call autonomous restructuring, i.e. the structural process of 
changings in an industry which appears as the resultant of a large 
number of uncoordinated, decentralised decisions by firms.
The industrial restructuring generated by such 
decentralised actions does not, however necessarily coincide with 
what is perceived to be the behaviour of firms in "perfect 
competition" - which has to be seen as only one possible outcome, 
among others, of a process like this.
Historical and structural production-immanent features 
(3-) have shaped the chemical-fibre sector, now characterised by 
competitive factors such as the qualities of the fibre, its 
advertising and promotion, technical advice to textile producers, 
research and development, blending, transfer pricing, large-scale 
production, etc. The man-made fibre industry's concentrating on 
these competitive strategies reflects its oligopolistic 
structure, as does, more strongly so, the fact of price-stability 
and price leadership (see for illustrations of this argument 
TISDELL and MCDONALD (1979, pp. 47-49), SHAW and SHAW, (1980, 
pp.220-221) and OPITZ, (1980, pp. 90-100)).
The idea, implicit in equilibrium theory and widespread 
among many politicians, of competition bringing about acceptable 




























































































seemed to be unwarranted for the chemical fibre sector. Rather, 
the opposite was true.
SCHENK (1982, also MUELLER, et.al., 1978 and for the 
chemical fibre industry in particular, OPITZ, 1980)), argues that 
overcapacities are related to an increasing oligopolization and 
internationalization of the industry, which happened to be the 
case for the chemical fibre sector.
SCHENK points to the fact that internationalization and 
oligopolization (autonomic growth, fusions (horizontal contraction 
of decision power) and vertical integration) leads to the 
elimination of the price-mechanism as a regulator of supply and 
demand.
He goes on to state that the elimination of the price- 
mechanism has had as an obvious consequence that the fight for a 
market share in the last decade has been increasingly dominated by 
the strive for a realisation of investment leadings. The hole in 
the market generated by a rise in demand will then be filled 
several times, overcapacity being the end result. This can also 
explain why the economic crisis has manifested itself on a 
specifically international level during the last decade. This 
frequent filling of the same gap certainly took place in the 
chemical fibre industry. Even in the midst of the crisis 





























































































Table 2 : Capacity and growth of selected European synthetic-fibre 
producers, 1974-1976.
1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6
L a n d
A u s l a s t u n g  
( in  P r o z e n t )
K a p a z i t a t  
( i n  1 0 0 0  
T o n n e n )
A n t e i l  a n  d e r  
E G - K a p a z i t a t
A u s l a s t u n g  
( in  P r o z e n t )
K a p a z i t a t  
( i n  1 0 0 0  
T o n n e n )
A n t e i l  a n  d e r  
E G - K a p a z i t a t
B u n d c s -
r c p u b l i k 8 5 9 0 2 3 7 77 1 0 0 3 3 6
G r o f l -
b r i t a n n i e n 7 6 5 2 3 21 7 0 5 9 0 21
I t a l i e n 7 4 4 5 2 19 7 5 5 4 4 2 0
F r a n k r e i c h 7 2 3 2 9 13 6 7 3 7 0 13
E G 7 8 2  4 2 5 1 0 0 7 3 2  7 5 1 1 0 0
Source : OPITZ, 1980, p.110
In the period of observation all suppliers have extended their 
capacity almost to the same extent, due to which their shares in 
the EC remained constant. Since the extension surpassed the 
demand, the capacity-utilization decreased from 78 per cent in 
1974 to 73 per cent in 1976.
Other factors were at play too, such as regional 
investment-programs in this very sector (e.g. in Italy and 
Ireland) and imports from cheap-labour countries. These two 
reasons cannot explain, however, why the same evolution can be 
witnessed in other ripened product markets (cellulosic fibres, for 
instance), without their inevitably leading up to permanent 
overcapacit ies.
At first, producers minimized their losses by 




























































































the sector was still left to the 'logic of market' or 'anonymous
restructuring' between 1973 and 1976. RfiONE-POULENC, for example,
announced the entire or partial closing of 18 chemical-fibre and
textile installations during two or four weeks between the first
of December 1974 and the 12th of January 1975 (12,000 workers were
affected by this measure). In the Netherlands AKZO proceeded to
reduce production for 6 plants. IIOECHST in Germany announced
short-term work for 3 plants during an unlimited time-period.
ICI, DU PONT and GLAHZSTOFF reduced capacity as well. Companies
in Belgium and Italy however, resorted to public restructuring,
being faced with governmental constraints and policies designed to
ensure continuing employment for the labour force. These public »
actions could be held responsible for a delay in the sector's 
adaption to the market which should exclusively have been one of 
production reduction; but, as seen before, in the autonomous 
sphere prevailing in the other countries, production was even 
increased and new installations were built in 1974 and 1975 .
The situation might have led to the complete 
disappearence cf an industry , with large scale capital depletion, 
subsequent large-scale loss of jobs, the latter having wider 
social and cultural implications. None of the firms at that
moment could be expected to have a strong enough counterinfluence 
on its environment. Considerations such as these may generate 
quite another interpretation of the general equilibrium thesis. 




































































































the need for 
his kind of
Yet, because of the 
or the industries 
at their disposal, 




Rut such a choice
organisational action for 
crisis. According to my
model, this can take on a private or public form. The 
characteristics of the organisational form which has been adopted 



























































































02. Public or Private Restructuring at European Level?
A. Private Restructuring.
The theoretical difference between the previous 
'autonomous' restructuring just mentioned and 'private' or 
'public' restructuring centers around the logic used (logic of the 
market vs. logic of organisation). When I refer to private 
restructuring I mean a form of 'organisation' of interests or what 
LAMBERS (1958) would call a form of institutionalisation. When 
dealing with these forms of restructuring one always has to keep 
in mind that it does not spring up out of nothing; the reason why 
it appears or already exists at all should be made an object of 
study.
However, there is still a big difference between 
'private' and 'public' restructuring. Most researchers see 
nonmarket regulation of firm behaviour as synonymous with direct 
regulation by the government. But I refer here to one of the 
least studied but probably most common forms of organisation in 
economic life. This category of "private restructuring" is an 
idealtype category in the same sense and on the same level of 
abstraction as the "anonymous" and the "public" and NOT an 
intermediate form of the two. It should not be confused with what 
is called the "mixed economy". This category is in general part 




























































































sense of government participation in market processes. Generally 
speaking, private restructuring refers to cooperation within the 
business sector. There is a substantial literature on "economic" 
forms of cooperation, such as cartels, mergers, etc., which should 
be taken into consideration. There is, hovyever, at least one new 
body of literature refering to another form of organisation in the 
private sphere. The "political" cooperation, pointed to in this 
literature, could be called "collective self-regulation by 
capitalists" (see e.g. STREECK and SCHMITTEK 1984 and the cited 
literature ibid.) In order to compensate for the shortcomings of, 
and the self-destructive elements in, the market, and at the same 
time pre-empt state intervention, capitalists can band together 
and agree on mutual rules of conduct, limiting their own 
individual autonomy in their collective long term interests. Or, 
as STREECK and SCHMITTER put it, "... the 'public use of private 
organized interests' takes the form of the establishment, under 
state license and assistance, of 'private interest governments' 
with devolved public responsibilities - of agencies of regulated 
self regulat ion of social groups with special interests that are 
made subservient to general interests by appropriately designed 
institutions." (1984, p.21)
Our case new, highlights industry self-regulation as an 
alternative form of non-market regulation that may supplement or 
complement direct regulation by the government (in my case the 




























































































previous 'private interest government'-concept as formulated by 
STREECK and SCiiMITTER is on]y one theoretical possiblity - though 
the best elaborated at this moment -, and probably points to the 
most "finished " form on a scale of self-regulation. The actions 
taken by the main chemical-fibre producers have to be located more 
towards the other end of such a scale, having not such an 
institutionalised form but nevertheless being characterised by a 
'logic of interorganizational concert at ion' among firms.
From a certain point in time (1976), the idea of 
cooperation became more attractive for the chemical-fibre 
producers than competition - or better, individual action. This 
is especially interesting since, in contrast to other European 
sectors, the initiative of working out a plan came from the 
producers themselves - in my words, the envisaged restructuring 
started off privately instead of publicly. It is the phenomenon 
which LAMBERS (1958) calls 'internal institutionalisation', by 
which he means a process of institutionalisation of the market by 
market-parties who are not pleased with the result of the market 
mechanism or better, with the logic of the market. "It is the 
effort to add an instrument by which the market is allowed to 
drift in the direction of proposed purposes". This is exactly 
what I mean by the appearance of the 'logic of organisation' or 
more loosely the 'logic of interorganisational concert at ion'. It 




























































































attention from the single organisation to the larger system of 
which it is part.
The first question which is then coming up is, why and 
how should organisations - in my case, firms - define their policy 
in the context of what TRIST defines as an organisational 
'domain'. Usually, the decision to initiate resource reallocation 
is decentralised to the individual firm.
The fact that the problem of the different chemical- 
fibre producers was perceived by themselves as a structural 
problem on the European level can most effectively be explained in 
terms of, on one side, the focally uncontrollable structural 
change (i.e. autonomous restructuring) and at the other side, the 
industry-specific characteristics such as the relative 
surveyabi1ity of the numbers of firms, the homogenity of the 
sector, the economic structural factors (cf. BOWMAN (4)), the 
attention given by the press, the interest it stirred within the 
EC and, last but not least, the activities of the business 
association for chemical fibres on an European level, the CIFRS 





the producers' 'self-regulation' system the CIFRS was 
as a specific reference organisation i.e. an 
which is controlled by the member organisations.




























































































subsystem, in the sense of its supposed ability to build consensus 
among the members or to keep the domain together.
Within this organisation an agreement was reached which 
intended to decrease the capacities of the chemical textile fibres 
in Europe by 15 per cent up to the 31st of December, 15 per cent 
being approximatively half of the existing overcapacity. In the 
withdrawing quotas already reduced capacities of Germany, the 
Netherlands and Great Britain since 1975, were taken into account. 
All participators had to restrain from installing new plants, 
although modernization of the old ones was allowed. The demand- 
increase expected up to 1981 would be distributed according to the 
capacity quotas of 1976, uniformly among all participants. This 
agreement was reached remarkably quickly among the non-Italian 
producers.
During an interview in Paris in 1984, I have asked a 
staff-member of the International Chemical Fibre and Rayon 
Committee how it was possible that the negotiations leading to a 
restructuring of the chemical-fibre industry between the 11 main 
producers could have gone as smoothly as they seemed to have, 
judging from the press-reports, and moreover, how they could have 
been effective. How was it possible that such giants, normally 
being very competitive, gave up potential short-term profits, and 
could trust each other in this productivity-reducing move? The 
answer was simple. The prisoner's dilemma, the logic of 




























































































concerning the fact that a strategy of not paying dominates the 
strategy of paying in a situation where a public good is provided 
(i.e. a good characterized by the impossibility of exclusion, also 
of those who did not provide anything to the provision of it) were 
solution-immanently eliminated. The chemical fibre sector really 
consists of a set of three different products - nylon, polyester 
and acrylic (see Annex 1). Producers did not negotiate on 
decreasing their total production, only on lowering that of their 
least profitable fibre. The production of that one was often set 
to null while production of more profitable items was even 
increased. The next question was then, of course, whether this 
means the end of the competition in the chemical-fibre sector. 
The answer was yes and no. Yes, for Europe as a production 
market , but not for the world market where the Europeans are more 
succesfull again, (cf. the industrial policy of France)
> This seems to me a case in point of the circumstances in 
which organised networks can help solve individual problems. From 
this follows that being a member of such a restructuring circle 
can bring one individual actor advantages besides collective ones 
(see for similar conclusions, RRAAM, 1973, Ch. 7 and 10).
At the same time - this is no coincidence, as we shall 
see - the EC started to worry about the European chemical fibre 
industry. This triggered the phase of what I choose to call 
'public' restructuring on the European level. During the very 




























































































restructuring objectives, described above. Both however melted 
into one network from 1976 onwards.
B. Public Restructuring.
Public restructuring has been defined as a process which 
is the intended or unintended outcome of policy and planning, in 
the first place, by the state. This is the difference to the 
other component. of the collective-action category, private 
restructuring, where the producers are mainly the ones who try to 
reorganize matters.
As mentioned before, public restructuring appeared in 
the 1970s in Western Europe's chemical fibre industry at two 
different levels, the national and the international.
The public restructuring at the national level took a 
very pronounced shape in Belgium, France and Italy whereas the 
public restructuring-strategies at the EC-level took a much more 
diffuse form - if we can speak there of a public restructuring.
Let us first give a very short, rather illustrative, 
picture of the national public restructuring effort before turning 
to my focal actor, the European Community.
FABELTA, the subsidiary company of the AKZO-group (NL) 
which had been working at a loss for quite a while, was taken into 
public ownership in early 1976 as an alternative to the closure of 




























































































Likewise, the French state ma'de massive financial 
outlays to its bio three: RfiONE-POULENC, CdF-CHIMIF. and PIEHINCY 
UGINE KUHLMANN in order to "eliminate overlapping operations so 
that they will, be better able to compete on an international 
scale" (Chemical Week, 1974). According to the chairman of the 
UNION DES INDUSTRIES CHIMIQUES: "the companies now want to 
complement each other rather than get involved in abnormal 
competition" (Chemical Week, 1974).
The most striking illustration of national state- 
intervention was the restructuring of the Milan-based conglomerate 
MONTEDISON, due to heavy financial losses. In March 1977 the 
Italian government threatened to suspend its subsidies to 
MONTEDISON if that company's subsidiary MONTEFIBRE closed its 
obsolete plants in Piedmont and ceased co-operation in the 
development of a major fibre complex at Ottan'a in Sardinia. The 
plants stayed open and government aid continued, including the 
payment of the wages by the state for 6000 MONTEFIBRE workers.- As 
plant closure was being prevented by such government 
interventions, state assistance was at the same time being used to 
extend synthetic fibre capacity in the case of the Italian 
industry. Here, obviously, the "national interest" appears: the 
confluence of the ideological currents that coalesced to refloat 
MONTEDISON (the trade union movement, the ruling political parties 




























































































This is not the proper place for evaluating these 
different national policies; we will keep them in mind, however, 
when turning to the public actions undertaken within the framework 
of the European Community.
A Short Overview of the Chemical Fibre Case.
As mentioned before, the 1977 situation in the 
synthetic-fibre sector was one of decreasing demand, excess 
capacity, numerous new investment projects, a fall in prices and 
considerable financial losses.
After a discussion of the problems of the chemical-fibre 
sector during two meetings of the "Senior Officials of Industrial 
Affairs" (29th of Oct. and 6th of Dec 1976),. and after the general 
turmoil in the EC-Commission concerning the change of the 
Commissioners at the end of 19,76, the new Commissioner for 
Industrial Affairs DAVIGNON reached a cooperation plan'with the 
producers within the Community. This agreement was finally signed 
in Brussels between eleven enterprises (BAYER, HOECHST, AKZO, ICI, 
COURTAULD, RflOME-POULEMC, EABELTA, MONTEFIBRE, SIC, ANIC and SNIA; 
MONSANTO and DU POUT as US subsidiary companies did not 
participate because of legal problems, but they announced their 




























































































The agreement, which was valid for three years, included 
a plan for cutting back capacity to be implemented by June 1979. 
The aim was a reduction in capacity of the European Community's 
firms by 400,000 tons or 15 per cent. -The remaining capacity was 
not to be increased before the 31th of December, 1979. Details 
concerning the capacity to be eliminated and reports on the 
implementation of the reduction measures were to be communicated 
to an arbitrator appointed with the agreement of the DG IV 
(Directorate General for Competition) in the Commission. This 
cutback plan was accompanied by an agreement on production quotas 
which took account of the general features of the situation in 
Italy in order to minimize losses on recent investments. Although 
Italian output was to be reduced in the short term, non-Italian 
manufactures undertook as a quid pro quo to allocate to Italy 35 
per cent of the increase in demand, estimated at 270,000 ton. The 
text of this agreement was finally communicated to the Commission 
on July the 14th 1978.
It was understood right from the start that the 
agreement would have to comply with the rules on competition as 
established in the Treaty of Rome. In the Commission, the DG IV 
observed at an early stage that an individual exemption following 
Article 85(3) (6) was out of the question in view of the 
impossibility, for a crisis cartel of the scope envisaged, to meet 
the final condition of that paragraph, being that competition must 




























































































the escape clauses provided. It did not improve the production of 
goods, nor did it promote technical or economic progress. It was 
just an old-fashioned market-sharing agreement and therefore 
needed a special dispensation from Brussels, which could only be 
provided by the Council of Ministers acting unanimously. Since 
this was perceived as very unlikely, not least because of the 
differences in member states' attitudes to industrial policy but 
also because of more general criticism to crisis cartels, DAVIGNON 
(DG III) and VOUEL (DG IV) jointly produced a proposal for a new 
draft Regulation, which could authorize "crisis cartels", to 
partition the market and raise prices (7).
The anticipation of problems, especially as a result of 
the chemical-fibre crisis, by the Directorate of Competition and 
the Directorate of Industrial Affairs shows that the Commission 
now really wanted to act. VOUEL saw a chance to use his legal 
competences in a positive way and DAVIGNON wanted to use this 
sector, in which cooperation by the industry really seemed to be 
possible, as a precedent. Parallel to this general possibility 
for reaching crisis cartels, of which that of the chemical-fibre 
sector could become the first, it was nevertheless suggested to 
the fibre firms that they should notify the text of their already 
reached agreement to the Commission under Regulation No.17, after 
which they would be able to implement the agreement pending the 
Commission's decision. This application could, in due course, bo 



























































































cartel, once the draft regulation had been adopted by the Council 
of Ministers.
The proposal ran up against strong opposition from a 
number of members of the Commission and though it had majority 
support , was - because of t tie veto-rule in the Council of 
Ministers - withdrawn in July 1978 after a failed final attempt by
JENKINS, the president of t he Commission, to placate the
opposit ion (8) . The failure of the draft proposal to win
Commission support did not mean an immediate end to the cartel. 
After the producers formally notified the Commission of the cartel 
in July, they could maintain it legally until it was rejected by 
the Commission. The rejection came in November 1978 when the 
Commission reached the conclusion that the notified agreement in 
its existing form was incompatible with Article 85. The 
Commission, however, decided not to serve notice on the 
enterprises concerned, as it could have under Article 15(6) of 
Regulation No. 17, but instead declared them immune to fines. ' The 



























































































Source : CIFRS, 1981, annex
Eighteen months after this cartel formation (see "1st AGREEMENT" 
in fig. 1) the producers - receiving the Commission's deadline for 
initiating legal action - amended a modified agreement in January 
1980 (with informal assistance from Commission Officials). This 
time, bilateral purchasing contracts (9) were agreed upon instead 
of the controversial national-production quotas. Now, VOUEL 






































































































one. The new cartel was accepted and renewed 
AGREEMENT in fig. 1) and 1982. By 1982, 
reduced by 400,000 tons, with the Benelux 
the greatest proportional reduction (54%), 
(41%), France (40%), Germany (22%) and Italy
Evaluation of the Pictured Events:
A Public Restructuring on European Level?
The events on the level of European politics amount to a 
fight between two groups of politicians, those in favour of a 
market solution in the case of crisis in an industrial sector and 
those in favour of a public policy solution (but on the European 
level). The actual restructuring process was not, in the end, as 
one would expect, a compromise between the two; rather it came 
down to being feasible of the industry's self-regulation plans. 
This came about without being noticed by either of the actors 
favouring the market solution or those advocating the public one.
The first and probably most succesfull policy-option 
taken by the Commission was the prohibition of state-assistance to 
the chemical-fibre sector (Art. 92-94). The discussion started on 
the 6th of December 1976 within the "Senior Officials Group for 
Industry" , and resulted in a global initiative by DG III. This 




























































































no more capacity-increases through state-aid could be tolerated. 
On the 22nd o£ June, 1978, the Commission took the decision to 
send the letter to the different Governments with a term of two 
years. This initial harmonious cooperation should not be 
interpreted as a "corporate" action but rattier as a coincidence of 
interests of the three groups taking stand in the industrial 
restructuring of the sector, i.e. (a) those favouring a market 
solution (those countries with a liberal philosophy of market 
competition and the Directorate General for Competition), (b) 
those favouring an industrial-policy solution (those countries 
with a prediliction for direct intervention and planning and the 
Directorate General for Industrial Policy) and (c) the industry 
itself with its associational system favouring a solution which 
was neither market nor public oriented.
Each of these three forces has its own dynamic:
(a) The market solution seemed to be grounded on merely
ideological grounds. The politicians advocating it can safely be 
called more catholic than the pope since the firms themselves took 
a much more pragmatic stance in finding a solution, knowing as 
they did that a market solution would bring about the end of 
Europe's chemical-fibre industry.
A "competition policy" such as the prohibition of state- 




























































































or sector in a , national state is held alive with financial aid 
which enable' it to sell its goods at a cheaper rate than other 
producers which may be working more efficiently. Here, a 
collectivity or community can be harmed by the misbehaviour of one 
or more national states. But this should not lead to the 
assumption that the leave-it-to-the-market approach always winds 
up restoring the perfect market system.
A measure such as prohibition of state aid is evidently 
grounded on the decision-makers' assumption that, this state 
intervention removed, the sector has been brought back to some 
kind of unhampered, free market. More often than not, however, 
state intervention occurs as a result of market failures instead 
of being one itself (10). As KNIGHTON pointed out at the 
Conference on Competition Policy of the European Community, it 
appeared that private enterprises can suffer heavily under the 
competition policy because they are made to compete AS IF they 
were in a truly competitive environment, when in fact there are 
still many barriers to competition within the Community (SMELLIE, 
1983, p.279). Within the chemical fibre sector, the market never 
seems to lead to a perfect allocation of resources ( see supra and 
JOLIET, 1981, p.221), even in those cases where that market is not 
"impeded" by the state. Leaving such a sector to its own dynanism, 
which obviously is not that of the free-play market, can lead to 
the disappearance of the more effective firms or to an even more 




























































































multinationals can for a long time cross-subsidise production 
units which are working at a loss (as H0ECH5T, BAYER, ENKA, etc. 
did in this case) whereas this is not possible for smaller, less 
differentiated firms. Helping the latter by public finances, 
then, should not be considered indicative for their lesser 
effectiveness.
It has to be mentioned that the evolution (the 
"autonomous restructuring") of the chemical-fibre sector has led 
up to a point where neither Article 85 (refers to agreements of a 
vertical or horizontal kind between enterprises that by their 
restrictive nature are liable "to affect trade between member 
states and have as their object or effect the distortion of 
competition within the Common Market") nor Article 86 (refers to 
the "prevention of abuse by enterprises which have a dominant 
position within the market"), are capable of grappling with the 
structural aspect of the problem. Both articles possess an 
exclusively 'negative' scope, based as they are on the idea that 
removal of restrictive agreements resp. abuse of a dominant 
position, restores a free and equitable market. This must lead to 
the observation as made earlier by BALASSA, that "there is a 
certain duality in the proposals of the Commission which ... 





























































































(b) Others state that alterations to industrial structure require 
a 'positive' Community policy (cf. ALLEN, 1983, p.211). However, 
what seems to be the problem here is the absence of a political 
institution capable of making binding decisions whenever it seems 
structurally impossible to leave the decision to 'neutral' market 
forces. This would provide an alternative to what ALLEN (1983, 
p.232) calls the "tenacity with which many of those working within 
the DG IV adhere to the exact letter of the law on relatively 
minor technical matters, whilst ignoring more serious judgements 
in politically sensitive areas, ... a bureaucratic desire not to 
rock the boat". This "bureaucratism", however, must not be 
overvalued as a 'dysfunctional' factor. The fact that the Treaty 
of Rome relies almost entirely on market integration, and made no 
provision for a coherent industrial policy, seems to be more 
important here and can at the same time explain the behaviour of 
the DG IV, at least partially.
Note that the Commission lately does seem to be shifting 
from a 'negative' interpret at ion of its powers in the competition 
sector - banning particular types of state-aid that might 
'distort' the market - towards a more positive one, seeking to use 
its powers as established by the Treaty to develop a concerted 
European response to the particular problems of individual 
industries (see especially the 12th report on Competition Policy, 
1982 ; pp. 158,183,185,191,194 ). The question remains whether the 




























































































worsening crisis leads to more nationalist, protectionist 
measures, whereas the new policy needs a great deal of consensus 
within the EC; obviously counter acting forces.
A much more radical solution for pursuing a global 
industrial policy could be the changing of the Treaty to avoid 
juridical obstacles in the future. This alternative has been 
tried out by the DAVIGNON-VOUEL proposal (cf. supra and JOLIET, 
1981). What this proposal exactly tried to institutionalize was 
the 'state'-option for policy-making. It wanted to give the EEC 
the legitimate exercise of force towards industry.
Many of the actions of the Commission and especially of 
its most active part, DAVIGNON and his crew, can be interpreted 
within the framework of these plans towards changing the Treaty 
(see pp. 23-24).
In contrast to what is commonly said concerning this 
case, I happen to think that it was not DAVIGNON, as the 
Commissioner of industrial affairs, who came to reach an agreement 
between the 11 largest producers but rattier they themselves, 
helped as they were by their organisation, the CIFRS. A statement 
also made by Fendel: "Die fachliche Leistung liegt im vorliegenden 
Fall... weniger bei der DG III-Mitarbeitern als vielmehr in der 
Kooperationswilligkeit der Unternehmen begruendet" (1982, p.581). 
The "Kooperationswilligkeit" was not, however, perfect since the 
CIFRS did not seem to be capable of involving the Italians in the 




























































































never be effective. This persuading of the Italians was just like 
the prohibition of state-aid, a conditio sine qua non for the 
industry's plans and at the same time for the overall scheme 
DAVIGNON had in mind (11).
The CIFRS addressed itself to DRAUN (DG III) on the 24th 
of October, 1977, asking for help. This time it really was the 
almost legendary resource of "influence" borne by the person of 
DAVIGNON (cf. see also FENDEL, 1981) which brought about the 
solution. A day after the addressment of the CIFRS, on the 25th 
of October, 1977, upon meeting the Italian Minister for Industrial 
Affairs DONAT-CATTIN in Esch in the matter of the steel industry, 
he also managed to open the possibility for contacts with the 
Italian Ministerial bureaucracy) in the matter of the chemical 
f ibres.
The impression which one gets here, i.e of a DG III 
working itself to the bone for a particular interest-group (and as 
such corroborating the neo-marxist theory of integration) must 
strongly be relativized. Obviously this was a process of mutual 
exchange. The DG III helped the industry to the ingredients for a 
production-reduction recipe, which seemed workable at first, 
whereas the industry helped the DG III to a case through which it 
could prove that such solutions can be arrived at in collaboration 
with the industrial sector. Thus it was precisely this case which 
had to exemplify for DAVIGNONs plan for bringing about a change in 




























































































Even if a political institution or policy, capable of 
performing industrial policies, could have been created the 
question remains whether it could be more effective on an European 
level then on a national level.
We have argued that the problems of the chemical fibres 
are world-wide problems, hence the Community is for that reason no 
more an optimal policy-making unit than is the nation state - at 
least in this case - since the capacity reduction should be world­
wide (JOLIET, 1981). A European public policy concerning 
industrial affairs would run the risk of adopting European 
protectionist measures (cf. Multi-fibre-agreement and STRANGE's 
(1979) conclusion for the steel, textiles and shipbuilding 
sectors), being exactly the opposite of the effect European 
integration used to have in the 1960s, when it clearly contributed 
to international trade liberalization.
(c) As I have already described in the private-restructuring part 
(p.13), the industry itself had a more pragmatic solution in mind 
than either the state or the market-opt ions . A market solut ion 
was perceived as an act of self-destruct ion whereas at the same 
time apprehension concerning governmental action was expressed.
Notwithstanding the fact that there seemed to be a lot 
of action around the chemical-fibre sector in those days, the 
steps taken by the Commission, should not been seen as 




























































































"meta-regulator", i.e. regulating self-regulation, without being 
really aware of this. The Commission brought in resources which 
were very important to the self-regulation system of the industry. 
This was quite often expressed directly. An TCI representative 
for example, expressed in the explanatory debates on the 17th of 
March, 1977, his apprehension concerning governmental action. On 
the other hand he stressed the appreciation of DG Ill's influence 
on the competition directory (DG IV) whenever that would lead up 
to legalization of stabilization through self-imposed agreements 
(12 ) .
Moreover, a comparison of the demands by the CIFRS as 
formulated in "The future of the Man-Made Fibre Industry in 
Western Europe" (1976) and the bilateral agreements of the EC with 
more than 30 export countries on "voluntary" limitations of 
textile-exports (regulation (EEC) Nr 3019/77 (30 dec 1977) gives a 
very harmonious picture.
All the EC's resources (legal, of influence, the simple 
fact of being a v.i.p. at the international level), which were 
indispensable for the industry's self-regulation plans, were being 
spent without the Community stating its own terms. This can only 
be explained by the fact that the EC was not aware of these non­
governmental, but no less non-market regulation, while being busy 



























































































03. General C o n c l u s i o n  and Policy Implications
We started this paper with the introduction of more 
general categories for studying the restructuring of an industrial 
sector. I have drawn the distinction between autonomous, private 
and public forms of restructuring. These categories, initially 
introduced with the aim of arranging the complex set of factors in 
a more or less reviewable way, have turned out to possess more 
than solely descriptive value. I will now discuss this, and try 
to formulate some policy implications.
Firstly, I have described the process of so-called 
"autonomous" restructuring in the chemical fibre sector. The fact 
that "autonomous" or decentralised restructuring does not always 
and exclusively take the form of marginal changes, is a very 
important conclusion reached here.
Apart from the fact that competition stimulates 
creativity, innovation, technological development, economic 
growth, dynamism, economic flexibility and so on, it can, as we 
have seen, lead to overproduction, economic crisis, bankcruptcy 
and massive lay-offs, detrimental to the well being of 
capitalists, workers and consumers. It has also been illustrated 
that such an overproduction can become more or less permanent, 
forcing business to sell at a price below the costs, thus forming 
a fatal threat to the industry.
Negative effects such as these, create the need for some 




























































































take the form of intervention by an outsider such as the state (in 
my case the EEC) which means the initiating of a public­
restructuring process. It can also take the form of the 
replacement of the "invisible hand" by a cartel-like organisation, 
or by regulation of business by voluntary associations, which can 
both be classified as private restructuring.
The transition from autonomous restructuring to this 
private form is a most interesting aspect for research. In this 
context, I have only been able to hint at some of the reasons for 
this evolution; a cross-national study could help us to understand 
better the logic of this transition.
The collectivity of competitors, or at least a 
substantial part of it, came to a formal contract. Such a self­
regulation presupposes some kind of interorganizational 
concertation of the competitors. The participants got together to 
agree on collective goals and have made use of an agency which 
could monitor and control the observation of the rules that were 
mutually agreed upon (as did the CIFRS in this case).
The organisation of, and regulation by a group of 
competitors is not, however, self-evident and is far from an easy 
option for them. First of all, it requires the competitors to 
develop an interest in regulation and organisation. Secondly, 
they have to overcome serious "prisoner's dilemma" problems. The 
temptation to 'free-ride' on collective action is high in a 
traditionally competitive environment. That means that one tries 




























































































sacrificing anything at all to it. Voluntary organisation and 
regulation only becomes possible when these kinds of problems are 
solved. In this case, they were apparently largely cleared up by 
the EC. This means that the Commission was at that moment able to 
assume the position of a strong political actor. This gave it the 
possibility, in theory, to enforce as 'public' a solution as 
possible within the 'self-regulation'-process of this industry.
However, the fact is that the restructuring of the 
European chemical fibre sector - after having shown signs of 
arriving at a private solution be it with a probable public 
outcome - finished as an ordinary cartel with disadvantages for 
employees and consumers. This evolution has, in my opinion, to be 
related to the way in which the problem was perceived, and the way 
it emerged within the EEC. Empirical evidence shows that the 
possible action-modus of private-interest government was not seen 
as a possible policy-option by the European policy-makers. The 
discussion concerning modes of conduct constantly drifted between 
the two alternatives of market and state. Some individual 
countries in the EEC and some directives were in favour of a state 
solution (i.e. "public policy", in this case, industrial policy). 
The latter could only be made possible by changing the Treaty of 
Rome, which failed. Others were in favour of a market solution, 
seeing competition as a form of organisation as the solution to 
the general problem of order in the economy, which is not 
necessarily false. The circumstances (as described in the




























































































market" solution at the time of the crisis ineffective and even 
dangerous. On the other hand, the state solution seemed 
especially unfeasible at the Community level, for the various 
reasons given in the section on public restructuring.
If the EC had been aware of the existence of its 
resources as illustrated here, and if moreover it had perceived 
the third possible form of organising business (i.e. private 
interest government) as being a possible functional equivalent to 
the other two forms of organising business, market and state, then 
a more satisfactory solution for all the parties involved (EEC, 
members-states, unions, consumers,...) could have been arrived at. 
The thrust of the argument is that the EEC, through its resources, 
helped the industry without any form of mutual exchange. Instead 
of dealing with interest conflicts arising from the choice between 
market and state, the EEC could have concentrated on being a 
strong partner in the construction of a self-regulating system, 
avoiding at the same time criticisms, like the one made by 
S.STRANGE: "International organisations concerned with trade 
matters (e.g. GATT, OECD and EC), have functioned increasingly not 
as the administrators and executors of international agreed upon 





























































































(1) For an exact description of the "chemical fibres" dealt with 
in this paper, see ANNEX 1, p.42
(2) My sources of information are statistics (the annual reports 
of CIFRS and the June edition of TEXTILE ORGANON), an 
interview (with a staff member of the CIFRS in March 1984 in 
Paris), academic literature, press sources (esp. BUSINESS 
WEEK, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, EUROPE, FINANCIAL TIMES, 
CHEMICAL AMD INGENNEERING NEWS, WALL STREET JOURNAL, DIE ZEIT, 
CHEMICAL WEEK, VISION and IIANDELSBLATT ) , reports of 
organisations such as the EC and the UNO and journals of 
business-associations (INDUSTRIE TEXTILE, TEX-TEXTILIS and 
CHEMIEFASERN).
(3) For example capital intensity, large scale units, research and 
development, a traditional considerable amount of 
concentrâtion/taking over leading to ever higher 
concentration, a remarkable shifting from the developed to 
underdeveloped countries, massively intruding in a world 
fibre market which was previously dominated by cotton 
producers, etc.
(4) In his article, "The logic of capitalist collective action",
drawing on the economic literature, BOWMAN (1982) defines 
eight market characteristics for which market cooperation is
most likely. If firms are few and buyers large in number,
orders are 'frequent, small and regular', demand is strong and 
inelastic with respect to prices, fixed costs are relatively 
low, entry is difficult and products are complex, then one can 
predict that there will be no need at the part of capitalists 
for an externally imposed reorganisation of their competitive 
game (BOWMAN, 1982, p.601). These are markets where the
repeated occurrence of the prisoner's-dilemma situation may 
subsequently transform itself into a 'supergame' in which 
cooperation is the dominant strategy. The mentioned 
characteristics fit the chemical fibre industry very well.
(5) The CIFRS was founded in 1950 in Paris. The aims are to
improve, increase and develop the use of rayon, of other 
artificial fibres, synthetic fibres and the products made
therefrom; they have contacts at the international level with 
other international organizations, whether governmental or 
professional. It consists of a General Assembly, a Managment 
Committee, a General Secretariat, working committees for 
economical, developmental and market research and statistics. 




























































































members arc national associations and individual producers 
(98) in 25 countries.
(6) For the text of the Articles and Regulations cited in this 
paper, see ANNEX 2, p.4 6
(7) A draft proposal which has the European Coal and Steel 





The most important were:
it was hard to see how production could be 
reducing production capacities and and putting a 
investments;
it could have created a precedent - from then on any 
industry suffering from the vicissitudes of the market or 
government policy or the unpleasant consequences of its own 
past decisions could run to Brussels for permission to form a 
private cartel in the public interest;
by getting the Council of Ministers to intervene in a field 
where the Commission was solely responsible for applying the 
rules to particular cases, the proposal would have meant a 
step backwards at the international level;
cooperation in one segment of the chemical industry (that 
is, fibres) could spill over, via the "group effect", into 
other segments of the industry, already one of the most 
concentrated in the European Community;
once formed, even if there were a time limit on the 
agreement, it might prove difficult to disband such a cartel 
once the crisis was over. Market sharing would become even 
more of a habit than it already was and the competitive spirit
If so, the industry would cease to. be 






Rather, by making each 
over-capacity "fairly",
was not accompanied by a logical plan to 
least efficient plants in the fibre industry.
firm "share" the burden of cutting 
the most efficient firms would have
had to do most of the cutting.
(9) Companies purchase goods from other firms and then resell them 
on the open market.
(10) I am not referring here to a direct link; rather, market 
failures lead to downfall of entire sectors or firms within 
states, whereupon the state intervenes, incited by, for 
example, electoral considerations.
(11) Another important factor here are also the different Multi 




























































































down the principles for expansion in trade. Between each 
country or, in the case of the EC, group, bilateral quotas are 
negotiated between each supplier and importer for every 
product that is thought to create disruptive conditions in the 
importer's country. Across the three MFA's, the EC gravitated 
from a halfhearted position in the first to a stronger 
protectionist stance in the second; and the last period, 1980- 
1983, saw the development of an even more protectionist 
position in the negotiations for the MFA3.
To my case the MFAs are important, in the same way as the 
state-aid stop, since they are very functional for the 
succeeding of an organised action of the chemical fibre 
industry. I mention them here only briefly since they have 
directly not something to do with the studied case.
(12) See also the conclusion of a COMITEXTIL/CIFRS report: "In 
short, the fibres arrangement constitutes an instrument by 
which the industry can return to the situation of market 
economy - from which it was diverging to a dangerous degree. 
We trust that the national governments will understand this 
fact and that if necessary, the EC-Commission will be there to 






















































































































































































ANNEX 1: Description of the sector's product: Chemical Fibres.
If we exclude glass, steel and other metal threads, 
asbestos and carbon fibres, which principally have industrial 
uses, the main man-made fibres used in apparel and within the 
home, can be split in two main groups - cellulosics and non- 
cellulosic fibres.
Cellulosics are produced from plant matter, normally softwood pulp 
which is processed into small sheets for the industry. Basically, 
these are dissolved in various chemicals (caustic soda is the main 
one) to form a liquid which is forced trough spinnerets (holes) to 
form filaments which solidify when leaving the spinneret. Viscose 
rayon and cellulosic aqetate yarns are: produced in this way. Thus 
the cellulosic fibre industry is principally based on a renewable 
resource. In terms of the volume of its use, viscose rayon is the 
leading cellulosic fibre. Like the other cellulosic fibres its 
production is principally based on wood pulp, although other 
renewable cellulosic material such as cotton linters and bamboo 
can be used. Cellulosic fibres have a wide range of end-uses as 
clothing, household items and in industry.
The non-cellulosics synthetic (or chemical) fibre industry is 
based upon the use of non-renewable resources. The production is 
based upon the use of plastic-type materials obtained usually from 
oil, coal or natural gas. The non-cellulosics can be divided in 
two main groups: staples (parts that are limited in the length and 
give yarns through spinning) and filaments (endless parts). Each 
of these can be broken down in Polyamid, Polyester and Acrylic. 
In my research this group of products forms the centre-point. The 
division in three products refers to different sources and 
different ways of production as well on different uses.
Dimethylterephtalate (DMT), acrylasitrile and 
caprolactame are the principal intermediate materials for 
producing the different synthetic fibres. These intermediary 
products are all finally oil derivates. The refining of crude oil 
and the fractioning, bound as both are to the subsequent chemical 
this render possible the producing of chemical fibres.
The global annual consumption of crude oil in Western Europe 
amounts to approx. 600 millions of tons. Of this, 10% is used for 
chemical industry:
9% for different chemical materials 
































































































































































































Polyamides ("Nylon") are produced by first manufacturing a nylon 
salt which is melted, extruded in a ribbon and broken into chips. 
These "plastics" chips are then used for spinning nylon filaments. 
The chips are heated electrically, the melt filtered, it is cooled 
by the air and' forms filaments which may be used to produce yarns.
Nylon 66 was discovered in the USA in 1935 by Dr Carothers, a 
scient ist working for Du Pont chemical Company. Du Pont 
commenced commercial production of nylon not long after. 
Nylon 6 was the polyamide adopted at first in Germany. The 
properties of the polyamides are slightly different. The 
largest proportion of world production of polyamides today is 
of Nylon 66 but production of Nylon 6 is not insignificant.
Polyester is manufactured mostly from oil derivates which are 
processed from polymer chips. Polyester fibre is formed by 
melting these chips and forcing the nolter polymer through a 
spinneret. The air solidifies the individual filaments almost 
immediately as they leave the spinneret and the filaments are 
drawn together to form yarn and wound on to cylinders.
Polyester was discovered in Britain by Whinsfield and 
Dickinson - of the Calicop Printers’ Association - following 
up Carother’s work. It was first manufactured in the USA by 
Du Pont in 1949 and in the following years in the U.K. by 
Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI). Du Pont marketed its 
polyester under the trade name "Terylene". Soon after its 
commercial production - which started in 1950 - polyester 
began to capture a major share of the non-cellulosic fibre 
market.
The main ingredient . of acrylic is acryloritnile produced, as a 
rule, from propylene which in turn is normally manufactured from 
natural gas or petroleum. But it should be noted that coal can 
also be used to produce acrylic fibres. Very often acrylic is 
substantially modified by the use of copolymers such as vinyl 
chloride and vinylide chloride. The resulting fibres are 
described as modacrylics. The spinning of acrylics is more 
complicated than the spinning of polyamides and polyesters. The 
compound to be used for spinning must be dissolved in solvents.
Acrylic fibre was first discovered and developed by Du Pont 
Tn the USA in the? early 1940s, though commercial scale 
production did not begin until 1950.
A close connection as we find between chemical fibre- 
producers and the chemical industry, one can also detect at the 
other side of the chain i.e. the textile industry. A sharp 
distinction between the chemical fibre and textile industry can 




























































































filaments become active in a traditional sphere of the textile- 
industry (Texturing). Also the sector textile-machines is 
influenced by the developments of the chemical fibres. The 
intensive information about applications to the textile industry 
by the fibre producers plays an important role.
Fig. 2 : The textile production-chain and its relation to other 
branches.



























































































ANNEX 2: Description of the Articles and Regulations dealt with in 
this paper.
Article 85
I. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the com­
mon market: all agreements between undertakings, decision by as­
sociations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect 
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect 
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other 
trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or 
investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parlies, thereby placing them at a competitive dis­
advantage;
(c) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the 
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject 
of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article 
shall be automatically void.
i. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared in­
applicable in the case of:
— any agreement or category of agreements between under­
takings;
—  any decision or category of decisions by associations of under­
takings;
— any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of 
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which art 
not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating com­





























































































Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be pro­
hibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may 
affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices 
or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive dis­
advantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by 
the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature 
or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts.
Article 92
1. Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a 
Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever 
which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it 
affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the com­
mon market.
2. The following shall be compatible with the common market:
(a) aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, 
provided that such aid is granted without discrimination related to the 
origin of the products concerned;
(b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or 
exceptional occurrences;
(c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal 
Republic of Germany affected by the division of Germany, in so far 
as such aid is required in order to compensate for the economic dis­
advantages caused by that division.
3. The following may be considered to be compatible with the com­
mon market:
(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the 
standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious under­
employment;
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of com­
mon European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the




























































































(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities 
or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect 
trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest. How­
ever, the aids granted to shipbuilding as of 1 January 1957 shall, in so 
far as they serve only to compensate for the absence of customs pro­
tection. be progressively reduced tinder the same conditions as apply 
to the elimination of customs duties, subject to the provisions of this 
Treaty concerning common commercial policy towards third coun­
tries;
(d) such other categories of aid as may be specified by decision 
of the Council acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission.
Article 93
l. The Commission shall, in cooperation with Member States, keep 
under constant review all systems of aid existing in those States. It 
shall propose to the latter any appropriate measures required by the 
progressive development or by the functioning of the common market.
2. If, after giving notice to the parties concerned to submit their 
comments, the Commission finds that aid granted by a State or 
through State resources is not compatible with the common market 
having regard to Article 92, or that such aid is being misused, it shall 
decide that the State concerned shall abolish or alter such aid within 
a period of time to be determined by the Commission.
If the State concerned does not comply with this decision within 
the prescribed time, the Commission or any other interested State 
may, in derogation from the provisions of Articles 169 and 170, refer 
the matter to the Court of Justice direct.
On application by a Member State, the Council, may, acting 
unanimously, decide that aid which that State is granting or intends to
grant shall be considered to be compatible with the common market, 
in derogation from the provisions of Article 92 or from the regulations 
provided for in Article 94, if such a decision is justified by exceptional 
circumstances. If, as regards the aid in question, the Commission has 
already initiated the procedure provided for in the first subparagraph 
of this paragraph, the fact that the State concerned has made its 
application to the Council shall have the effect of suspending that 
procedure until the Council has made its attitude known.
If, however, the Council has not made its attitude known within 
three months of the said application being made, the Commission 
shall give its decision on the case.
3. The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it 
to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. If it 
considers that any such plan is not compatible with the common 
market having regard to Article 92, it shall without delay initiate the 
procedure provided for in paragraph 2. The Member State concerned 
shall not put its proposed measures into effect until this procedure 





























































































The Council may, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal 
from the Commission, make any appropriate regulations for the ap­
plication of Articles 92 and 93 and may in particular determine the 
conditions in which Article 93 (3) shall apply and the categories of 




























































































Council Regulation No.17/62 (CUNNINGHAM, 1973)
1 8 - 1 6  A R T IC LE  15 
Fines
1. The Commission may by decision impose on undertakings or 
associations o f undertakings fines o f from one hundred to five thousand 
units o f account where, intentionally or negligently:
(a) they supply incorrect or misleading information in an 
application pursuant to Article 2 or in a notification 
pursuant to Articles 4 or 5 ; or
(b) they supply incorrect information in response to a request 
made pursuant to Article 11(3) or (5) or to Article 12, or 
do not supply information within the time limit fixed by a 
decision taken under Article 11 (5); or
(c) they produce the required books or other business records 
in incomplete form during investigations under Article 13 
or 14, or refuse to submit to an investigation ordered by 
decision issued in implementation o f Article 14(3).
2. The Commission may by decision impose on undertakings or 
associations of undertakings fines of from one thousand to one million 
units of account, or a sum in excess thereof but not exceeding ten per 
cent of the turnover in the preceding business year o f each o f the 
undertakings participating in the infringement where, either inten­
tionally or negligently:
(a) they infringe Article 8 5 (1 ) or Article 86 o f the Treaty-, or
(b) they commit a breach o f any obligation imposed pursuant
to Article 8 (1 ).
In fixing the amount of the fine, regard shall be had both to the gravity 
and to the duration o f the infringement.
3. Article 10(3) to (6) shall apply.
4. Decisions taken pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not be of a 
criminal law nature.
5. The fines provided for in paragraph 2(a) shall not be imposed in 
respect o f acts taking place:
(a) after notification to the Commission and before its decision 
in application o f Article 85 (3 ) o f the Treaty, provided they 
fall within the limits of the activity described in the 
notification;
(b) before notification and in the course o f agreements, 
decisions or concerted practices in existence at the date of 
entry into force o f this Regulation, provided that notifi­
cation was effected within the time limits specified in 
Article 5(1) and Article 7(2).
6. Paragraph 5 shall not have effect where the Commission has 
informed the undertakings concerned that after preliminary exam ­
ination it is o f opinion that Article 85 (1 ) o f the Treaty applies and that 
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